For a long time, the ASEAN states have viewed China more as a threat than a potential partner. At first, the ASEAN states were concerned mainly with political and military threats from the north.
7 Indeed, one of the primary reasons for the formation of ASEAN in 1967 was to counter the spread of communism in the region. 8 With China's emergence as one of the most competitive producers of many products in the world, ASEAN started to perceive China more as an economic threat. After all, there is remarkable similarity in their industrial structures: both specialize in labor-intensive products, and both have the US, EU and Japan as their major exporting markets. 9 To a large extent, China's increase in its exports during the last two decades of the twentieth century was achieved at the expense of its neighbors in Southeast Asia. With China's rise as a major exporter, it also started to suck FDI away from its neighbors to the south: as wage levels in China are much lower, it makes sense to invest in China rather than ASEAN states. While before 2001, ASEAN could still take comfort in the idea that China was largely excluded from the many benefits offered by the multilateral trading system, such as MFN, this advantage they enjoyed soon became history with China's accession to the WTO at the end of that year. With its foot into the global trade club, China can now enjoy more predictable access to its major export markets with much lower costs, and this means intensified competition against ASEAN. 10 Thus, China's call for an FTA at around the same time as its WTO accession is an offer too good to reject: on the one hand, the ASEAN states could not do much to stop China from replacing them in the major exporting markets; on the other hand, with the growth in the domestic market in China, an FTA deal with China, the first of its kind, could guarantee the ASEAN states a first-mover advantage in the largest emerging market in the whole world. The Financial Crisis of 1997 also taught ASEAN states important lessons: First, global institutions such as the IMF and World Bank are not panacea, and it is important to have regional cooperation mechanisms as contingency plans. With the growing importance of China as an economic power, however, any regional cooperation mechanism in this part of the world would not be effective without the participation of China. Indeed, China's decision to not devalue its currency was widely appreciated among ASEAN states as an important factor in helping them go though the period:
anyway, should China decided to float the Yuan, the ASEAN states would face more fierce competitions from cheaper Chinese products and this could have greatly eviscerated their problems. While Japan is also an important partner in regional cooperation, Japan was having its own problems during the 90s. Thus, China has become the natural choice. Second, it is important to diversify both their export markets and investment sources. Along with the growth of its domestic market, China also developed an increasingly bigger appetite for overseas investment. For ASEAN states, investments from China is a good way to make sure that their economic well-beings is not tied-up with the economic performances of a few economies.
With the ASEAN-China FTA as a starting point, China has firmly embarked on the road towards RTA. example is the FTA negotiation with Australia, which has languished for years partly due to the fact that Australia insists on dealing with services liberalization first while China wishes to proceed with the usual "goods and then services" order.
With regard to the issues which are not traditionally trade-related, such as environment protection, competition policy, and labor standard, China has been reluctant to include them as part of the FTA package. Recently, however, China has shown some willingness to include these issues as part of the FTA package. Nonetheless, in line with its cautious approach, China has largely chosen not to include these issues in the main agreement of the FTA, but preferred to address them in stand-alone side agreements or MOUs.
III. The criteria for selection of negotiating partners
When we take a look at the list of countries/regions which have negotiated or are negotiating
FTAs with China, it seems to be quite random. To start with, the top three trading partners of China, i.e., the EU, US and Japan, are not on the list. Furthermore, even when we expand the scope to include the top ten trade partners of China, only three, i.e., ASEAN, Singapore and Hong
Kong, have concluded FTAs with China. Among the remaining seven countries/regions, only another two, i.e., Australia and Korea, have started or about to start negotiations with China.
However, for one reason or another, these two negotiations are not going to proceed on a smooth basis. Among the other countries/regions which have concluded or are negotiating FTAs with China, many only have negligible trade volume.
One tentative conclusion that we can draw from the facts above is that trade volume doesn't seem to be an important factor for China in selecting its negotiating partners, otherwise we wouldn't have so few of the important trade partners in the list. How, then, does China decide which countries shall be graced with the honor of becoming a member of the coveted FTA club with China? In an interview done in May 2007, Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun of MOFCOM suggested the following criterion: first, the country has good political and diplomatic relationship with China; second, the country has complementary economic structures and trade patterns with China; third, the country either has substantial domestic market or serves as an FTA hub in a particular region;
fourth, the country shares common intentions on building FTAs with China.
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While these criterion combined seem to explain most of China's FTA activities so far, as the examination of these factors below reveals, some seems to have more importance than others:
First, political and diplomatic relationship seems to carry most weight, as almost all the countries Both services and agriculture are sectors that China is relatively un-competitive. On the other hand, several FTAs also compete with rather than complement with China. For example, most of the ASEAN countries actually share with China an industrial structure that relies heavily on export-oriented labor-intensive manufacturing sectors. Their exports are also mostly in electronics and textile products, similar to those from China.
Third, between domestic market size and hubbing effect, the latter seems to be more important.
Measured by most standards, the domestic markets of many partners are rather small. China generally will try to accommodate such request. This is in marked contrast to the approach taking by some other countries, especially the US and EU, where the selection of FTA partners seems to be mostly a one-way process.
IV. Negotiating objectives
What does China try to achieve with its growing list of concluded FTAs and those currently under negotiation? Has China managed to achieve the intended objectives? A review of China's growing FTA network reveals the following common features:
First, in terms of the geographical distribution of RTA partners, China has tried to strike a balance. Fourth, in terms of the trade pattern, these RTA partners mostly export raw materials, energy products, or agricultural products to China, while they import mainly textile products and electronic products from China. In order to maintain its position as the "World Factory", China would need a steady supply of raw materials and energy; also, as most of the agricultural sector in China is not very competitive due to its low per capita land ratio, China needs to ensure supply of agricultural products in order to free up its labor from agriculture and go into manufacturing. Thus, the RTA partners are probably chosen with these considerations in mind. Moreover, many of the RTAs also include investment provisions, which is another way for China to make sure that it can invest and subsequently control strategic resources.
Fifth, in the grand scheme of things, FTAs also provide a way for China to build up mutual trust with countries around the world and improve its image as a benign emerging power. With China's growing importance in the world stage, many countries started to feel the "China threat" with concerns that originate from China's ideological difference and political, military and economic weight. In East Asia, in particular, the United States-Japan coalition has historically exerted considerable political influence in Asia. Indeed, such influence has dragged China into quite a few conflicts and clashes with several ASEAN states during the second half of the twentieth century. With the amazing development in its economy, China once again has the opportunity to rise as a world power. China has maintained that it will adopt a course of "peaceful rise", which is interpreted by Prof. Zheng Bijian, the senior advisor to President Hu Jintao, to mean that:
"China will not follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I or those of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II, when these countries violently plundered resources and pursued hegemony. Neither will China follow the path of the great powers vying for global domination during the Cold War. Instead, China will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world." 31 However, the opportunity to seize the leadership role in Asia is too good for China to pass. As it would take quite some time before China could challenge the military dominance of the US in Asia, the economic integration with ASEAN and other economies in Asia will be the way to achieve political ends using economic ways. When the ASEAN economies found out that they are too dependent on China for their economic well-being, they could hardly ignore the political message from Beijing. Therefore, even though many commentators have doubted the economic benefit to China from an ASEAN-China FTA as the two are competitors on many products, China has adopted the guideline of "give a lot while demand little" 32 in the FTA negotiations as the political significance of such an FTA greatly outweighs economic considerations.
Sixth is the Taiwan factor. Since the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan 60 years ago, cross-strait reunification has become one of the most important political problems facing the Article XXIV of the GATT. 37 By calling them "arrangements" rather than "agreements", however, the mainland authorities were trying to avoid the impression that China was signing "international agreements". Instead, they are just some "arrangements" offered by the Central Government to local governments. Initially, China had insisted on using the same name for the deal with Taiwan. Recently, however, China has softened its position by agreeing to Area and the Mainland Area. The deeper the economic integration between the two sides, the more difficult it will be for Taiwan to be politically separate from China. Eventually, the economic ties between the two sides will be so strong that Taiwan will become more dependent on China than probably even Hong Kong and Macau.
Seventh, FTA also provide an effective way for China to push for trade liberalization in selected markets even though the multilateral negotiations have been moving only at a disappointing pace.
With the slow progress in the Doha Round, RTA has become the only feasible option to achieve trade liberalization. While this holds true for all WTO Members, China in particular has more to gain from bilateral-regional negotiations as it is placed in an awkward position in the current multilateral negotiations. First of all, As a newly-acceded Member, China is required to undertake a lot of commitments, many of which are higher than those of existing WTO members. It is already a humongous challenge for China to try to implement these commitments. After having been in the spotlight for 15 years, what China needs now is some quiet breathing space, which it can only get at the bilateral-regional level as China had to face the annual transitional review and bi-annual TPR in the WTO. Second, with most of its exports concentrated in labour-intensive or resource-intensive products, China would compete with rather than complement the industrial structure of other developing economies. It is no wonder that other developing economies view China as a competitor rather than a friend.
Indeed, notwithstanding that the Chinese government has repeatedly held that China is, and always will be, a developing economy, and in spite of the fact that the per capita GDP in
China is comparable to that of many LDCs, China is also the third largest trading power in the world and the only one among all developing economies to be among the top five traders worldwide. Thus, on many issues, China's interest is actually closer to that of major developed economies than that of developing economies. Agriculture is one such example: as China imports a large quantity of agricultural products, it is actually not in China's interests to follow the position of most developing economies and demand the elimination of export subsidies. Trade facilitation, one of the four "Singapore Issues," is another such example: as China exports a lot, it is actually in the interest of China to push for the inclusion of trade facilitation in the WTO framework to make the customs process more efficient and cheaper.
However, as China has formally joined G-20, the major developing country grouping in the WTO, it would be embarrassing for China to publicly depart from the G-20 party-line in Doha negotiations. At the bilateral-regional level, China would have more flexibility in asserting is true interests.
Eighth, FTA negotiations also provide a good opportunity for China to build up its trade negotiation capacity. Compared with other regions with have long been active in trade negotiations at both multilateral and regional levels, East Asia lagged behind. By engaging in FTA negotiations, these countries could develop the necessary negotiating expertise. Of course, it would not be good policy to risk FTAs with economically significant partners for the sake of honing the negotiating skills of the officials. This also explained why China chose to start the FTA negotiations with some countries that are less important economically. It's interesting to note that other countries in the region, such as Korea, also adopted the same strategy in its FTA negotiations.
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V. Conclusion
While initially reluctant to engage in FTA negotiations, China has gradually become an active player in the global rush to FTAs. While the number of China's FTAs still lags behind other major players, it is rapidly growing. As one of the most important trading nations in the world, China's decision to pursue an active path of FTA negotiation will undoubtedly have implications for all countries in the world. In particular, countries in Southeast Asia would be affected most by
